Columbia River Treaty Power Group Priorities
January 2017

A key provision of the December 2013 regional recommendation to the State Department is that the negotiation must result in a net increase in U.S. power benefits based upon the actual value of coordinated operations. The US should only provide benefits to Canada equivalent to one- half of the actual US downstream capacity and energy benefits received from coordinated operations as compared to a non-coordinated operation. The Power Group continues to support the Regional Recommendation as the foundation for negotiations between the United States and Canada.

The current application of the Treaty’s commercial power benefits provisions is unfair to the United States. The Treaty envisioned this possibility and includes a clause that would allow a 10-year notice of intent to terminate the provisions that disadvantage the US.  Issuance of the notice of intent would facilitate a timely and orderly transition to a new agreement or agreements which would more fairly allocate the benefits of coordinated operations.

The US should immediately issue the 10-year notice of intent to terminate the commercial power provisions of the Treaty.

Day to day leadership of the negotiation should be delegated to the U.S. Entity (composed of  the Bonneville Power Administration and Northwestern Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) with semi-annual check-ins by the State Department. There has been an overly lengthy 3-year federal process to initiate negotiations during which it has become clear that this negotiation is not a high priority for the State Department. This new approach would assure that the people with the necessary knowledge and key stakeholder access are empowered to advance the negotiations.  It also better matches the U.S. negotiators with their counterparts, since Canadian leadership will also be at the regional level.

A process must be established that assures key stakeholder interests are engaged in the negotiation process in a timely and meaningful manner.

Direction should be given to the US Entity to conclude the negotiations within 2 years from January 2017. 

Treaty negotiators should focus first on low water year strategies that can provide benefits to both electric customers and ecosystem functions.

Given multiple uncertainties about the future, and our experience of out-dated commercial power provisions in the existing Treaty, the negotiation should provide substantially more flexibility than the current Treaty. For example, an agreement that provides approximately 10 years of certainty with potential future modifications negotiated in advance of the next ten year term.  Replacement power provisions should be minimized under the Treaty and move toward commercial power arrangements managed outside the formal Treaty.

“Called Upon” flood control should be defined to allow implementation of the above changes and an agreed formula for payment from federal appropriations for post-2024 Called Upon flood control actions requested from Canada by the USACE. Consideration should be given to
creating flexibility in implementation of Called Upon in the event that the US government officially changes flood risk management in the Columbia River Basin.

Ecosystem issues should be addressed in negotiations with Canada consistent with the Regional Recommendation. These negotiations should recognize the ecosystem work currently being done pursuant to other regulatory and legal commitments, and should have strict financial and operational limits that assure the total package results in a net increase in benefits to electric customers in the United States.